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I. Introduction
“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments[;] . . . it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.”1

The landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education2 set the
precedent for the judiciary’s role in policymaking in public education, and
since the decision, the role has evolved to the point of being commonplace
in America.3 The majority view is that the Court’s active role in Brown was
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that de jure
discrimination was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
3. See Frank J. Macchiarola et al., The Judicial System and Equality in Schooling, 23
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 567, 567 (1996) (stating that since the decision in Brown, the judiciary
has increasingly become involved in resolving education issues, even those outside of the
Constitution).
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necessary to alleviate a crisis in education that had been prolonged and
exacerbated by majoritarian politics, and had it not been for the courts, desegregation would not have occurred.4 The most effective way to correct
this crisis was to put the decision in the hands of the judiciary.
Today, America’s public schools face a similar crisis in the form of
state-mandated seniority layoff policies—more commonly known as “last
hired, first fired”—in which school districts use seniority to determine
layoff decisions during “reductions-in-force,” or “RIFs.”5 While an
overwhelming majority of school districts use seniority as the most
important factor in layoff decisions, most states do not mandate that
seniority be the determinant factor.6 Fourteen states, however, actually
mandate seniority policies.7
“Last hired, first fired” policies deny children the right to an adequate
education by creating an unstable education environment, replete with
overcrowded classrooms and high teacher turnover.8 As discussed more
thoroughly infra, these education rights are legally enforceable, the denial
of which results in a violation of these students’ civil rights.9 “Last hired,
first fired” laws widen the education gap between minority and other
students, as high poverty inner-city schools are disproportionately affected
by these policies.10 Despite the detrimental effects of seniority-based
layoffs, little attention has been paid to this issue. If “last hired, first fired”
policies continue unchecked, poor and minority students will continue to
fall further behind as they are denied their constitutional right to an equal
educational opportunity.
Unlike the heavily-litigated issue of education finance reform, until
very recently courts had largely remained silent on the issue of “last hired,
first fired” policies in assessing the constitutionality of education rights.11
4. See JENNIFER L. HOCKSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 134 (1984) (“[W]ere it not for [the] courts, there
would be little reduction in racial isolation [in public schooling].”).
5. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, TEACHER LAYOFFS: RE-THINKING
“LAST-HIRED, FIRST FIRED” POLICIES 3 (2010), available at http://www.nctq.org
/p/docs/nctq_dc_layoffs.pdf (describing the process for district-wide layoffs).
6. See id. at 6.
7. See id. (discussing the various state and district layoff policies).
8. See discussion infra Part II.C. (detailing the negative effects of seniority-based
layoff policies).
9. See discussion infra Part II.E. (suggesting that denial of education rights through
“last hired, first fired” policies is the civil rights issue of our time).
10. See id.
11. See Amy L. Moore, When Enough Isn’t Enough: Qualitative and Quantitative
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The silence was broken with the January 2011 California Superior Court
decision in Reed v. State of California,12 which approved a class action
settlement halting “last hired, first fired” layoffs in the Los Angeles Unified
School District.13 Some academics have predicted that the decision in Reed
could spark a new wave of education litigation to reform “last hired, first
fired” policies.14 This Note will argue that “last hired, first fired” policies
adversely affect students’ educational rights and must be reformed. While
Reed is the first case to address these policies, it is possible to analyze the
role of the judiciary in education finance reform in order to predict whether
the judiciary will be an effective vehicle to bring about reform of statemandated seniority layoff policies, and how the courts will affect the
reform.
Part Two of this Note will provide an overview of “last hired, first
fired” policies, how they manifest themselves in different states and school
districts, the adverse effect they have on students’ educational opportunity,
and why such policies are ripe for reform. Part Three will analyze state
constitutional provisions as a mechanism for reform by addressing three
factors: the qualifying language of a state constitution’s education clause,
the state’s rejection or acceptance of education as a fundamental right, and
the state’s success in education finance reform. Part Three will also
analyze the emerging jurisprudence in order to determine the most effective
way to succeed in “last hired, first fired” reform, comparing “equity” claims
to “adequacy claims” using two recent reform cases. Finally, Part Four will
propose that emerging jurisprudence provides two viable options for “last
hired, first fired” reform, depending on each state’s acceptance or rejection
of education as a fundamental right, and will address solutions to potential
reform challenges.

Assessments of Adequate Education in State Constitutions by State Supreme Courts, 41 U.
TOL. L. REV. 545, 546-47 (2010).
12. No. BC432420 1 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2011) (determining that senioritybased layoff policies violated students’ rights to an equal educational opportunity).
13. See id. (approving the proposed class action settlement that haled layoffs for up to
forty-five schools).
14. See Simone Wilson, L.A. Teachers Union Loses Historic Lawsuit to ACLU: No
More ‘Last Hired, First Fired’ L.A. WEEKLY, (Jan. 21, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://blogs.
laweekly.com/informer/2011/01/aclu_wins_lawsuit_utla_seniori.php (last visited Mar. 2,
2012) (describing the potential effects of the Reed decision on other states).
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II. Background: State-Mandated Seniority Layoff Policies in Public
Schools: “Last Hired, First Fired”
In the face of tangible problems such as funding disparities and class
sizes, teacher quality is a facet often overlooked in education reform
analysis.15 Studies have shown, however, that teacher effectiveness is a
powerful tool in implementing student outcomes nationally.16 One study
suggests increasing the effectiveness of teachers by one deviation—for
example, from “average” to “very good,”—produces the same effect as
decreasing a class size by thirteen students.17 The New Teacher Project
published a study addressing the “Widget Effect:” “The tendency to treat
teachers like interchangeable parts rather than individual professionals,
based on the false assumption that one teacher is the same as another.”18
The “Widget Effect” illustrates the problem inherent in “last hired, first
fired” policies.
A. “Last Hired, First Fired” Defined
1. Reductions-in-Force
“Last hired, first fired” policies come into play during district-wide
layoffs, known as reductions-in-force, (or “RIFs”) in which districts are not
contractually obligated to reassign teachers, meaning that teachers lose not
just their current assignments, but also their jobs.19 Usually, when a
teaching position is cut because of a program or school closing, teacher
contracts guarantee new assignments.20 During a district-wide layoff (RIF),
15. See THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, How Federal Education Policy Can Reverse the
Widget Effect: Transforming ESEA Title II to Improve Teacher Effectiveness and Student
Outcomes 3 (2006), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED518132.pdf (“An outsized
focus on class size reduction perpetuates the widget effect by overlooking and failing to act
upon the differences in effectiveness among teachers.”).
16. See id. (stating that research has shown teacher effectiveness to have a greater
impact than reducing class size).
17. See id. (comparing the importance of effective teachers to the importance of
reducing class size).
18. THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, The Widget Effect: Our National Failure to
Acknowledge and Act on Differences in Teacher Effectiveness (2009), available at
http://widgeteffect.org/downloads/%20TheWidgetEffect.pdf.
19. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 5, at 3 (distinguishing
layoffs from the “routine ebb and flow of positions among a district’s individual schools that
occur every school year”).
20. See id. (explaining the reassignment process for routine position cuts).
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however, districts have no contractual obligation to reassign teachers.21
Declining enrollment in public schools, inadequate financing, and the
elimination of programs all result in RIFs, triggering these last hired, first
fired policies.22 Currently, The New Teacher Project places fourteen states
at “high risk,” meaning those states mandate quality-blind layoffs during
RIFS, thirty-three states are at “medium risk,” where they leave the
decision to local school districts or allow (but do not require) multiple
factors to be considered during RIFs, and three states are at “low risk,”
requiring that teacher performance be a major factor in layoff decisions.23
2. How the Policies Work
Seniority-based layoff polices come by several names, such as “last
hired, first fired” or “last in, first out” (also known as “LIFO”), but they all
work in largely the same way in every district that employs them.24 The
district first determines the layoff pool, either by targeting a particular grade
or subject area—in which all teachers in that grade or subject area are
included—or decides to make reductions in every grade, in which case
every teacher is included in the layoff pool.25 Once the pool is determined,
districts with state-mandated seniority-based layoff policies have no
discretion in selecting which teachers are fired—those with the least
seniority are the first to go.26 In other words, “last hired, first fired.”

21. See id. (contrasting normal position cut policies with district-wide layoff policies).
22. See BONNIE B. TAYLOR, EDUCATION AND THE LAW: A DICTIONARY 202 (1996)
(defining “reductions-in-force”).
23. See THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, The Case Against Quality-Blind Teacher Layoffs.
Why Policies that Ignore Teacher Quality Need to End Now 1 (Feb. 2011),
http://tntp.org/assets/documents/TNTP_Case_Against_Quality_Blind_Layoffs_Feb2011F.pd
f?files/TNTP_Case_Against_Quality_Blind_Layoffs_Feb2011F.pdf (illustrating the layoff
risk level for each state).
24. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 5, at 3 (describing the
layoff process for districts that employ seniority based layoff policies).
25. See id. (describing how districts determine the pool of teachers eligible to be laid
off ).
26. See id. (describing the layoff process in districts with state-mandated seniority
layoff policies).
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B. How “Last Hired, First Fired” Policies Are Manifested in Public
Schools
1. Bargaining Agreements
Because states have governance over public schools, it is within each
state’s discretion whether districts can engage in collective bargaining; all
states except five, however, currently require or permit collective
bargaining.27 With the exception of Hawaii (where teachers negotiate
employment agreements at a statewide level), bargaining occurs at the
district level between the board of education and a union representative.28
State policy, however, still influences collective bargaining in a number of
ways, such as prohibiting strikes or dictating the terms of arbitration.29
Currently, thirty-four states require collective bargaining for public sector
employees, eleven states permit collective bargaining, and five states
explicitly prohibit collective bargaining.30
In collective bargaining agreements, the principle of seniority often
occurs in three forms: determining compensation, determining the order in
which teachers are transferred, and—most importantly to this discussion—
determining the order in which teachers are laid off during RIFs.31 Of the
forty-five states that allow collective bargaining, three states—California,
Nevada, and Iowa—have layoff policies that are a mandatory subject of
bargaining.32 Illinois and Ohio permit layoffs to be a subject of bargaining,
while five states prohibit layoffs policies to be a subject of bargaining:
Idaho, Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana, and Tennessee. Every other state

27. See Emily Cohen, Kate Walsh & RiShawn Biddle, Invisible Ink in Collective
Bargaining: Why Key Issues Are Not Addressed, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY,
July 2008, at 4 (assessing the state role in establishing the scope of bargaining).
28. See M. Finch and T. Nagel, Collective Bargaining in the Public Schools:
Reassessing Labor Policy in an Era of Reform, WIS. L. REV. 1573, 1579 (1984) (discussing
the recent growth of teacher unionism and collective bargaining).
29. See Michael Colasanti, State Collective Bargaining Policies for Teachers, State
Notes, Education Commission of the States, Jan. 2008, at 1 (addressing each state’s policy
with regard to collective bargaining agreements).
30. See James Joyner, Public Employee Bargaining Rights, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY
(Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/public-employee-bargaining-rights/
(providing a map of collective bargaining rights by state).
31. See id.
32. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY TR3 DATABASE: TEACHERS’ RULES,
ROLES, AND RIGHTS, State Bargaining Rules, http://www.nctq.org/tr3/scope/ (last visited
Feb. 21, 2013) (illustrating the bargaining policies of each state).
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either fails to address the issue in state law or administrative code, or has no
state statute regarding public sector collective bargaining.33
2. State Law
From a historical perspective, the state legislatures have been the most
common tool for regulating the operation of public schools, either directly
or through state boards of education.34 Many school governance decisions
are relegated to individual school districts, but certain elements such as
licensing standards and the extent they are enforced are governed at the
state level.35 With regard to RIFs, many states leave layoff determination
criteria to the individual school districts.36 Fourteen states, however, have
mandated “last hired, first fired” policies: Alaska, California, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.37
C. The Negative Effects of “Last Hired, First Fired”
The problem inherent in “last hired, first fired” policies is very similar
to the problem vocalized by the “Widget Effect,” i.e. teachers are not
evaluated based on quality or effectiveness. In the District of Columbia,
this lack of attention to teacher quality resulted in widespread controversy
surrounding District layoffs.38 When Washington, D.C. Schools Chancellor
Michelle Rhee performed a layoff of close to 400 teacherS in 2009, she
took advantage of the fact that the District does not have mandated
seniority-based layoff policies.39 She refused to use seniority as a
determining factor in who would be laid off, basing her decision on a D.C.

33. See id.
34. See EDUCATION POLICY AND THE LAW 438 (David L. Kirp et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992)
(providing an overview of the reform, regulation, and restructuring of public school
systems).
35. See Linda Darling-Hammond, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A
Review of State Policy Evidence, 8 EDU. POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 10 (2000) (providing
an overview of the differences in state policy regarding teaching).
36. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 5, at 6 (detailing states’
latitude in last hired, first fired policies).
37. See THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, supra note 23, at 6 (summarizing state latitude in
determining criteria for teacher layoff policies).
38. See id. at 5 (“The lack of attention to teacher quality inherent in this process is one
of the reasons why Washington, DC’s layoffs raised so much controversy.”).
39. See id. at 1 (summarizing the controversy surrounding the 2009 D.C. layoff).

RIF’D OFF

477

Regulation clause that made “school needs” the determining factor rather
than seniority.40
In the wake of the D.C. controversy, the National Council on Teacher
Quality (NCTQ) conducted a study to examine district policies for making
layoff decisions in order to answer the important question emphasized by
the D.C. decision: “what factors should be considered when school districts
must decide who will stay and who will go?”41 The study examined data
from 100 school districts, representing twenty percent of all public schools
in the United States.42
The study found that seniority-based layoff policies have several
legitimate advantages: the system is objective, protects those teachers who
are most invested in a school district, and supports teachers who would
have the most trouble finding a new job late in their careers.43 Proponents
of “last hired, first fired” policies also contend that the system benefits
students by providing them with more experienced teachers.44 The NCTQ
study, however, firmly rejects the longstanding assumption that experience
correlates to quality.45 Other studies have reached the same conclusion
when measuring teacher effectiveness over time. One study conducted in
2009, Assessing the Potential of Using Value-Added Estimates of Teacher
Job Performance for Making Tenure, concluded that after three years of
teaching, teachers generally hit a plateau and no longer increase in teaching
effectiveness, thus illustrating that third-year teachers are no less effective
than long-tenured teachers.46 Another study even suggests that longtenured teachers decrease in performance toward the end of their careers.
In sum, as one study stated, “[w]hile the simplicity and transparency of a
40. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 5, at 1 (describing the legal
basis on which the D.C. Chancellor rested her decision to base her layoff decision on factors
other than seniority).
41. Id.
42. See id. (providing an overview of the Teacher Rules, Roles, and Rights (TR3)
database used to conduct the study).
43. See id. at 1–2 (outlining seniority’s pros and cons).
44. See id. at 2 (“It has long been assumed that a seniority system produces the best
results for children, under the assertion that the most experienced teachers are better
teachers.”).
45. See id. (stating that the assumption that most experienced teachers are better
teachers proves not to be true).
46. See Dan Goldhaber & Michael Hansen, Assessing the Potential of Using ValueAdded Estimates of Teacher Job Performance for Making Tenure Decisions (Nat’l Ctr. for
Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Educ. Research, Working Paper No. 31, 2010), available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/1001369_assessing_the_potential.pdf.
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seniority-based system certainly has advantages, it is hard to argue that it is
a system in the best interest of student achievement.”47
Additionally, the NCTQ study illustrates that “last hired, first fired”
policies indirectly lead to an increase in classroom size. Because new
teachers cost less than tenured teachers, when districts use seniority-based
layoff policies they are forced to fire a greater number of teachers.48 Firing
a greater number of teachers naturally results in fewer teachers per district
and therefore increased class sizes. The study gives an illustration of
closing a ten million dollar deficit in a district serving 34,500 children with
a current average class size of 23 students. The study estimates the cost of
a twenty-year veteran at $100,000, meaning 100 teachers would be fired
and class sizes would increase from twenty-three to twenty-five.49 In
contrast, the cost of a new teacher is estimated at $50,000, resulting in a
layoff of twice as many teachers and an increased classroom size from
twenty-three to twenty-seven.50 Other comparisons to seniority-neutral
models yield similar results. One researcher from the University of
Washington suggests that a nationwide ten percent school budget cut,
allowing districts to look at factors other than seniority, could save over
250,000 jobs.51 Studies have shown that these increases in class size have a
direct effect on student achievement, especially in the lower grades.52
Moreover, it is not just an assumption that seniority-based rather than
quality-based layoff policies result in a less effective corps of teachers.
According to two recent studies, only thirteen to sixteen percent of the
teachers laid off in a seniority-based system would also have been given
pink slips in a quality of effectiveness based system, meaning that more
than eighty percent of seniority-based layoffs would result in more effective
teachers being cut.53 These studies also found that ineffective teachers
47. Dan Goldhaber & Roddy Theobold, Assessing the Determinants and Implications
of Teachers Layoffs (Nat’l Ctr. for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Educ. Research,
Working Paper No. 55, 2010), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/1001496Assessing-Teacher-Layoffs.pdf.
48. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 5, at 2 (illustrating that
seniority-based layoffs lead to more jobs lost and consequently larger classroom sizes).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. (referencing the research of Marguerite Roza, which suggests that
switching to a seniority neutral policy could reduce teacher layoffs from 875,000 to 612,000
in a 10% nation-wide school budget cut).
52. See Steven G. Rivkin, Eric A. Hanushek, & John F. Kain, Teachers, Schools, and
Academic Achievement, 73 ECONOMETRICA 417, 444–45 (2005).
53. See THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, supra note 23, at 4; see also Goldhaber
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result in 2.5 to 3.5 fewer months’ worth of academic progress in one year,
compared to a teacher of average effectiveness.54
D. The Need for “Last Hired, First Fired” Reform
Despite the problems inherent in seniority-based layoff policies,
seventy-five percent of the districts analyzed in the NCTQ study use
seniority as the determining factor in teacher layoffs.55 As previously
noted, while many states leave layoff determination criteria to the
individual school districts, fourteen states have mandated “last hired, first
fired” policies.56 The NCTQ urges states to pass laws mandating teacher
performance as the determinant factor rather than seniority: “Because state
law trumps local policy, even that of collectively bargained contracts, any
state could pass a law that requires performance to be a factor in layoffs.”57
Such a policy would be in line with other white-collar professions where
seniority-based layoff policies are very uncommon.58 While states could
pass these laws, the more pertinent question is whether they will exercise
this power. Currently, only Arizona has a law prohibiting seniority from
being used as the determinant factor in teacher layoffs.59 As analyzed
below, this Note predicts that prohibition of “last hired, first fired” policies
could become the next wave of education reform.

&,Hansen, supra note 46.
54. See THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, supra note 23, at 5 (explaining why senioritybased layoffs drag down student achievement).
55. See id. at 4 (providing an overview of the current policies in 100 districts in the
TR3 database). In the twenty-five districts where seniority was not determinant, sixteen
districts used teacher performances as a weightier factor, six districts used a case-by-case
determination (though usually seniority-based) and three districts used multiple criteria. See
id.
56. See id. at 6 (summarizing state latitude in determining criteria for teacher layoff
policies).
57. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 5, at 6.
58. See id. at 1 (“The factory model approach of last-hired, first-fired is unusual
among white collar professions. For example, struggling newspapers have usually chosen to
buy out fewer senior, higher paid employees rather than layoff larger numbers of younger,
less-expensive employees.”).
59. See id. at 6.
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E. “The Civil Rights Issue of Our Time”

Until very recently, education reform has focused predominantly on
education finance.60 During this time, the courts were largely silent on other
matters of education quality.61 The evolution from federal to state law and
from equity to adequacy illustrated in the evolution of reform strongly
suggest that the new wave of reform could move away from finance and
toward teacher quality. President Obama has called education reform the
“civil rights issue of our time” and has made efforts to eliminate
achievement gaps between minorities and other students.62 Speaking to
teacher effectiveness specifically, he has said, “I reject a system that
rewards failure and protects a person from its consequences. The stakes are
too high. We can afford nothing but the best when it comes to our
children’s teachers and the schools where they teach.”63
“Last hired, first fired” policies affect inner-city (and consequently
minority) students more than others. Research shows that reverse-seniority
layoffs hit inner-city schools the hardest because less-experienced teachers
tend to aggregate there.64 For example, one report concluded that teacher
layoffs would be unevenly distributed in the Los Angeles Unified School
District, the school district at issue in Reed, because the district was forced
to use “last hired, first fired” policies.65 Because twenty percent of the
60. See William F. Dietz, Manageable Adequacy Standards in Education Reform
Litigation, 74 WASH. U. L. REV. 1193, 1193 (1996) (discussing the three waves of education
finance reform). Reform has typically been categorized into three waves: The Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of state
constitutions, and education adequacy under state constitutions. See id. at 1193–94.
61. See K.T. Cochran, Beyond School Financing: Defining the Constitutional Rights
to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 399, 399–400 (2000) (“American courts have
steadfastly refused to hold teachers and school systems liable for failing to educate
individual students. Despite widespread concern about the quality of education offered in
the nation’s public schools, state courts have refused to hear so-called ‘educational
malpractice’ claims brought against local schools.”).
62. See Helene Cooper, “Obama Takes Aim at Inequality in Education,” N.Y. TIMES,
Apr.
6,
2011,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/07/us/politics
/07obama.html?_r=0 (describing President Obama’s goals for education reform).
63. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the meeting of the Hispanic Chamber of
Commerce (Mar. 10, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_
press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-to-the-United-States-Hispanic-Chamber-ofCommerce).
64. See Mark Osmond, Taking Failing Schools to Court, EDUCATIONNEXT (Sept. 12,
2011), http://educationnext.org/taking-failing-schools-to-court/.
65. See INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION, AND ACCESS, Sharing the Burden?
The Impact of Proposed Teacher Layoffs Across LAUSD, http://idea.gseis.ucla.edu/
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district’s first-year and second-year teachers are assigned to high-poverty
schools that have high concentrations of minority students, these students
would be the most adversely affected.66 The New Teacher Project asserts
that in seniority-based layoffs, the poorest schools are subject to 25% more
layoffs than the wealthiest schools.67 Another study reports:
Also problematic is the uneven effect seniority-based layoffs may have
on various schools. It has been extensively documented that in higherpoverty, higher-minority schools, teachers tend to be less experienced
than their colleagues at wealthier, lower-minority schools. Where these
patterns hold, minority and poor students will undoubtedly see more
turnover in their teachers from seniority-based layoffs. When this
happens, the district’s remaining teachers are shuffled as staff are
imported from elsewhere in the district to backfill some of the disparate
teacher losses in schools with more junior teachers.68

As such, seniority-based layoff policies make an ideal candidate for
reform, now that Reed v. State of California has called the constitutionality
of such policies into question.
As shown above, state mandated “last hired, first fired” results in sharp
declines in teacher quality. In itself, however, this cannot instigate a new
wave education reform. Seniority-based layoff policies very clearly have
an adverse effect on public school system,69 but until recently, the policies
were not regarded as unconstitutional. In Reed, a court for the first time
addressed this issue of whether the adverse effects of “last hired, first fired”
policies go so far as to interfere with students’ state constitutional right to
“basic equality of educational opportunity.”70

publications/files/Layoffs-LAUSD.pdf (last visited July 24, 2013) (concluding that innercity schools are adversely impacted by the state-mandated seniority-based layoff policies in
California).
66. Id.
67. See THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, supra note 23, at 7.
68. See Cristina Sepe & Marguerite Roza, Schools in Crisis: Making Ends Meet. The
Disproportionate Impact of Seniority-Based Layoffs on Poor, Minority Students, May 20,
2010, http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED516845.pdf (highlighting the negative impact of last
hired, first fired on high-poverty and high-minority schools).
69. See discussion supra, Section II.C. (discussing the problems inherent in seniority
based layoff policies).
70. Reed, No. BC432420 at 1 (citing Butt v. State of California, 4 Cal. 4th 668, 685
(1992)).
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III. Analysis: State Constitutional Provisions as a Mechanism for Reform
A. Past Success: The Story of Education Finance Reform
1. The Evolution of the Judiciary’s Role in Education Reform: Brown v.
Board of Education and San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez
Until the recent developments in Reed, education reform focused
primarily on education finance.71 Education finance reform has typically
been categorized into three waves: the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the education equity arguments under state
constitutions, and education adequacy under state constitutions.72
Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, the judiciary began
to take a more active role in education reform. Although it concerned a
federal Equal Protection Clause issue, Brown provides an appropriate
starting point because it illustrates “the special place of educational
opportunity in our social system as a justification for the exercise of
searching constitutional review.”73 Nonetheless, after declaring in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez74 that there is no federal
constitutional right to education, the Supreme Court’s role has been
somewhat limited. As the Court stated in Rodriguez:
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection
under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is
implicitly so protected. As we have said, the undisputed importance of
education will not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual
standard for reviewing a State’s social and economic legislation.75

71. See William F. Dietz, Manageable Adequacy Standards in Education Reform
Litigation, 74 WASH. U. L. REV. 1193, 1193 (1996) (stating that though the legislative
branch is obligated to set up education finance, reform of financing systems has often been
litigation-based).
72. See id. at 1193–94 (“Commentators often categorize education reform litigation
into three waves.”).
73. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 117 (1995).
74. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that a
school-financing system based on local property taxes was not unconstitutional because
education is not a fundamental right).
75. Id. at 35.
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Despite this limitation, “the Supreme Court has provided a framework
for consideration of certain student rights.”76 These rights, however, have
been limited to issues of equality and integration.77 While rejecting
plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment argument, the Court in Rodriguez
nonetheless explicitly called for state courts to take on the issue through
state constitutions.78 In the majority opinion, Justice Powell stated that the
matter should be addressed in state rather than federal courts, using
“judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State’s efforts and to the
rights reserved to the States under the Constitution.”79 Thus, despite the
limitations in Rodriguez, the judicial system remains a powerful vehicle for
education reform advocates.80
2. The Shift to State Courts
a. Equal Protection Claims
Advocates for education reform thus found an alternative outlet for
relief—through state constitution clauses.81 While state constitutions vary
widely, they typically contain a provision synonymous with the Equal
Protection Clause and an “education clause” that provides for a system of
public schools, allowing plaintiffs to brings claims of constitutionally
inadequate schooling.82 When plaintiffs first turned to state law claims in
the wake of Rodriguez, they brought challenges based on both education
76. Macchiarola et al., supra note 3, at 582.
77. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969), Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
78. See Ken Gormley, Education as a Fundamental Right: Building a New Paradigm.
Forum on Public Policy at 207 (“It is important to underscore that the majority of the U.S.
Supreme Court in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, even as it rejected plaintiffs’ argument that a
fundamental right to education was buried in the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal
Constitution, issued a broad invitation for states to examine the issue under their own
constitutions.”).
79. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 39.
80. See Dietz, supra note 71, at 1193 (“Litigation has long been a tool of education
reform advocates.”).
81. Josh Kagan, A Civics Action: Interpreting “Adequacy” in State Constitutions’
Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241, 2242 (2003) (“The U.S. Constitution contains
no clause directly addressing education, thus state constitutions’ education clauses provide
plaintiffs with claims that could avoid a federal bench unwilling to hear right to education
cases.”).
82. See Enrich, supra note 73, at 105 (providing an overview of state constitution
education provisions).
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clauses and equal protection rights.83 Equal protection challenges for
education reform, however, were not as successful.84 Courts rejected equal
protection challenges for a myriad of reasons: courts found that students
were not entitled to equal amounts of funding, that district wealth was not a
suspect class, and that education was not a fundamental right.85
b. Equity Claims
Thus, courts moved from equal protection clauses to state educational
clauses—this wave of litigation is commonly referred to as the “equity
cases.”86 As one scholar described, “[u]nder an equity theory, plaintiffs
argue that the education clause of the state constitution mandates some
measure of equality that the state financing laws fail to provide. The
remedy they seek is substantial equality of funding for all school
districts.”87 In this line of cases, courts sidestepped the equal protection
problems because the focus was not on an equal education generally, but on
an equal system, including facilities, curriculum, and classroom sizes as
well as money.88
However, even under the more versatile groundwork of state education
clauses, courts were reluctant to require uniformity between funding in

83. Avidan Y. Cover, Is “Adequacy” A More “Political Question” Than “Equity?:”
The Effect of Standards-Based Education on Judicial Standards for Education Finance, 11
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 404 (2002) (describing the initial wave of education
finance reform).
84. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 281 (N.J. 1973) (stating a reluctance to
decide an education reform case upon the State equal protection clause because “the equal
protection clause may be unmanageable if it is called upon to supply categorical answers in
the vast area of human needs”); see Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 865 (S. Ct. App. W.
VA. 1979) (stressing that it would be very difficult to use equal protection as a basis because
of the demands on inflexible statewide uniformity).
85. See Enrich, supra note 73, at 1200 (stating the reasons that the vast majority of
second-wave challenges failed) (citing Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005,
1018 (Colo. 1982); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 770 (Md.
1983); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989)).
86. See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform
Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 317–18 (1991) (“Education clauses provide a basis
independent of equal protection clauses for rejecting a state’s school finance scheme on
equity grounds.”).
87. See id. at 319.
88. See id. at 317 (“Unlike equal protection arguments, education clause arguments do
not demand an equal education, but an equal system, which involved facilities, curriculum
offerings, teacher-student ratios, and money.”).
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different school districts.89 Courts proved hesitant to accept equality
because of the difficulty in determining what education equality actually
required, because “state constitutional guarantees of equal protection are
commonly couched in broad and indefinite terms.”90 Additionally, an
interest in local power and the immense cost the equalization would place
on taxpayers have added to the courts’ opposition to equality claims.91 For
example, in Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education,92 the
Maryland court failed to find an equity claim in the “thorough and
efficient” language of the state constitution, instead finding that such
language mandated some minimum quantum of education.93 This marked
the next of education reform: education adequacy under state constitutions.
c. Adequacy Claims
Courts took their cue from Rodriguez, in which the court hinted at a
possible adequacy claim, stating that “[e]ven if it were conceded that some
identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected
prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no
indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas
provide an education that falls short.”94 In this wave of reform, state
supreme courts began for the first time to analyze the meaning of adequacy
in their state constitution education clauses, resulting in a new body of law
addressing the right to an education.95 The shift to adequacy broadened the
scope of interpretation because, though the issue was still finance reform,
the focus was no longer a comparison of monetary distributions, and instead
shifted to whether the state had fulfilled its constitutional obligation to

89. See id. at 327 (stating that when state courts denied equity claims, they often held
that qualifying language such as “thorough and efficient” was never meant to ensure
uniformity).
90. See Enrich, supra note 73, at 163–64.
91. See id. at 160 (explaining courts’ reluctance to engage in equity claims).
92. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ. 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983) (holding
that the state constitution did not mandate equality in per-pupil spending).
93. See id. at 639 (stating that a thorough and efficient education need not be equal).
94. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1973).
95. See Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State
Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1325 (1992) (“More recently, plaintiffs in
education rights litigation have placed greater emphasis on whether the money provided for
education by the states is minimally adequate to provide the level of education attainment
required by the education articles of state constitutions.”).
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provide certain quality of educational opportunity.96 The details of the
equity versus adequacy arguments will be discussed in more detail infra,
but here they serve to illustrate the evolution of education reform from
federal to state courts, and from equal protection to education clause
arguments.97
This evolution, however, was hardly clear-cut; in many decisions,
courts addressed both equity and adequacy claims.98 Well into the
evolution of the adequacy claims, courts were still addressing equality
problems; in Ohio, for instance, the court focused primarily on the disparity
between the richest and poorest school districts.99 As one noted education
reform scholar described, “[d]espite this momentous shift in the legal and
substantive educational underpinnings of school finance litigation and
despite the modestly visible shift toward a more reform-oriented state
judiciary in school finance cases, a review of the judicial opinions in the
‘third wave’ cases suggests that education reform litigation in the 1990’s
was hardly monolithic.”100
B. The Role of the State Legislatures in Education Reform
Advocates of “last hired, first fired” reform will—as they did in
finance reform—face the issue of judicial deference to the state
legislature.101 The landmark case for this conflict was Lujan v. Colorado,102
which, though not a Supreme Court case, established a trend for rational
basis review of education legislation.103 Other states followed Lujan’s lead.
96. See id. (describing the evolution of education finance reform challenges from
equity to adequacy).
97. See discussion infra Part III.E.1–2.
98. See William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A ReExamination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1192-93 (2003) (noting that “a review of the judicial opinions
in the “third wave” cases suggests that educational reform litigation in the 1990’s was hardly
monolithic. First, in those judicial opinions, one sees as much talk of ‘equity’ as
‘adequacy’”).
99. See generally DeRolph v. Ohio, 677 N.E. 2d 733, 746 (Ohio 1997).
100. See generally Koski, supra note 98, at 1192–93.
101. See Hubsch, supra note 95, at 1326 (1992) (“The single most difficult issue facing
advocates of educational entitlement is state judicial deference to the state legislatures’
efforts to establish and maintain a state-wide system of education.”).
102. Lujan v. Colorado, 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982) (rejecting a challenge to the state
school funding system that was based on the state’s education clause).
103. See id. at 1022 (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to legislation involving economic
and social policy).
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This standard of review asks only whether a state legislature’s school
financing system rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose.104
The main argument set forth by critics of judicial activism in education
reform is that educational adequacy is largely a legislative issue.105
Consequently, the most difficult issue facing state courts is deference to
state legislative attempts to create state-wide systems of education.106
Furthermore, the judiciary has no federal constitutional right to an
education to fall back upon; the Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez stated explicitly that there is no fundamental
right to an education under the Constitution.107 The Supreme Court’s
dismissal of a federal constitutional right, however, does not circumvent the
judiciary’s role in education reform, and in the past quarter century
education reform has slowly worked its way into the courtroom, but not
through federal rights.108 Instead, the issue is relegated to state courts.109
While the Supreme Court might have rejected a federal constitutional right
to an education, nearly every state constitution notes a right to an
education.110 In order for the judiciary to play an active role in reforming
state mandated seniority layoff policies, the argument must be framed to
portray education as a state constitutional right.

104 See id. (“Having concluded that no suspect class or fundamental right is involved,
the remaining step in equal protection analysis is to determine whether the Colorado public
school finance system rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose.”).
105. See Martha McCarthy & Paul Deigan, What Legally Constitutes an Adequate
Public Education? A Review of Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Mandates, PHI
DELTA KAPPA EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION 54 (explaining that most states impose statutory
program specifications in order to gauge educational adequacy).
106. See Hubsch, supra note 95, at 1326 (noting that the complexity of education issues
and the controversial nature of judicial activism in education cause state courts to defer to
the legislature).
107. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)
(“Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal
Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”).
108. See Hubsch, supra note 95 at 1326 (noting that since the 1970s, state supreme
courts have begun to address the issue of state constitutional education clause meanings).
109. See id. (“Recently, several state courts have, with varying degrees of enthusiasm,
begun to determine whether education articles in state constitutions contain a legally
enforceable constitutional guarantee.”).
110. See Kagan, supra note 81, at 2241–42 (noting that after Rodriguez, education
advocates turned to state education clauses, since nearly every state constitution requires the
state to provide its children with an education).
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C. Analyzing the Language of Education Clauses

The education clauses of each state vary somewhat in the language
used to establish a duty to maintain and fund public schools, though the
vaguely-worded statutes leave much room for interpretation.111 Since 1971
when the first major school-funding suit was filed in California, forty-five
state courts have addressed challenges to the constitutionality of state
funding for public schools.112 As one scholar notes, “[t]he jurisprudential
logic employed by state courts in invalidating school funding provisions has
been as varied as the provisions they have relied on.”113 Wording ranges
from “general and uniform,” “general and efficient,” “quality,” “high
quality,” and “sufficient.”114 As such, “the outcome of an education rights
case may depend heavily on the language of the state constitution’s
education article.”115 This language diversity in education clauses must be
taken into account when analyzing different state systems. The state
constitutions can loosely be categorized by language focusing on equity116
and language focusing on adequacy.117
1. Equity Language in Education Clauses
A number of state education clauses use language either explicitly or
implicitly mandating an equal educational opportunity.118 The most
common language implying equality is the word “uniform.” Fourteen
states require that the state provide a uniform education: Arizona mandates
a “general and uniform” system,119 Colorado requires “thorough and
111. See Hubsch, supra note 95, (highlighting the difficulties in defining the standards
set forth in state education clauses).
112. See Gormley, supra note 78, at 213–14 (discussing the success of lawsuits
challenging the constitutionality of states’ education funding schemes).
113. See id. at 215.
114. See Hubsch, supra note 95, at 1335 (explaining that the diverse descriptions
provide a good source of state jurisprudence for education reform).
115. Id.
116 . See McUsic, supra note 86, at 320 (“The state constitutions may be categorized
according to the strength of their support for an equity claim.”).
117. See id. at 326 (“Under a standards theory, a plaintiff argues that the education
article of the state constitution mandates some absolute minimum level of education that
certain districts are failing to meet.”).
118. See id. at 319 (stating that the language of some state constitutions requires that
the state provide for an equal education).
119. See ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“The Legislature shall enact such laws as shall
provide for the establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school
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uniform,”120 Florida requires “uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high
quality,”121 Idaho mandates a “general, uniform, and thorough” system,122
five states require a “general and uniform” system (Indiana,123 North
Carolina,124 Oregon,125 South Dakota,126 and Washington127), three states
solely require uniformity (Nevada,128 Wisconsin,129 and North Dakota130),
system . . . .”).
120. See COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable,
provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free
public schools throughout the state, wherein all residents of the state, between the ages of six
and twenty-one years, may be educated gratuitously.”).
121. See FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (“Adequate provision shall be made by law for a
uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows
students to obtain a high quality education and for the establishment, maintenance, and
operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the
needs of the people may require.”).
122. See IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The stability of a republican form of government
depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature of
Idaho, to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free
common schools.”).
123. See IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1 (“Knowledge and learning, generally diffused
throughout a community, being essential to the preservation of a free government; it should
be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual
scientific, and agricultural improvement; and provide, by law, for a general and uniform
system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall without charge, and equally open to all.”).
124. See N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“The General Assembly shall provide by taxation
and otherwise for a general and uniform system of free public schools, which shall be
maintained at least nine months in every year, and wherein equal opportunities shall be
provided for all students.”).
125. See ORE. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (“The Legislative Assembly shall provide by law
for the establishment of a uniform, and general system of Common schools.”).
126. See S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“The stability of a republican form of government
depending on the morality and intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the
Legislature to establish and maintain a general and uniform system of public schools
wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all; and to adopt all suitable
means to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education.”).
127. See WASH. CONST., art. IX, § 2 (“The legislature shall provide for a general and
uniform system of public schools. The public school system shall include common schools,
and such high schools, normal schools, and technical schools as may hereafter be
established.”).
128. See NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 2 (“The legislature shall provide for a uniform system
of common schools, by which a school shall be established and maintained in each school
district at least six months in every year . . . and the legislature may pass such laws as will
tend to secure a general attendance of the children in each school district upon said public
schools.”).
129. See WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3 (“The legislature shall provide by law for the
establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable . . .”).
130. See N.D. CONST. art. 8, § 2 (“The legislative assembly shall provide for a uniform
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New Mexico mandates “uniform and sufficient”131 and Wyoming calls for a
“complete and uniform” system.132
Additionally, two of these states—New Mexico and North Carolina—
as well as two states with no uniformity requirement—Montana and
Louisiana—have state constitutions that explicitly require education
equality.133 New Mexico’s clause deals specifically with Hispanic children,
stating that they “shall forever enjoy perfect equality with other children in
all public schools.”134 However, as one scholar notes, “[a]lthough
appearing limited in scope, the clause may have as broad an impact as a
more general clause. Since more school finance inequities occur primarily
in minority schools, it is likely that a financing regime that would provide
equality between Latinos and Anglos in New Mexico’s public schools
would provide equality to all children.”135 The other three states provide
for general equal opportunity:
Montana states that “[e]quality of
educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the state,”136
Louisiana’s constitution states that the purpose of the public educational
system is so that “every individual may be afforded an equal opportunity to
develop his full potential,”137 while North Carolina’s states that “equal
opportunities shall be provided for students.”138

system of free public schools throughout the state, beginning with the primary and extending
through all grades up to and including schools of higher education . . . .”).
131. See N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (“A uniform system of free public schools sufficient
for the education of, and open to, all the children of school age in the state shall be
established and maintained.”).
132. See WYO. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (“The legislature shall provide for the establishment
and maintenance of a complete and uniform system of public instruction, embracing free
elementary schools of every needed kind and grade, a university with such technical and
professional departments as the public good may require and the means of the state allow,
and such other institutions as may be necessary.”).
133. See McUsic, supra note 86, at 320 (“The first group of state constitutions—those
of Montana, Louisiana, New Mexico, and North Carolina—provide the strongest
commitment to equality, be actually using the word ‘equality’ in defining the state’s
obligation.”).
134. N.M CONST. art. XII, § 10.
135. See McUsic, supra note 86, at 320.
136. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(1).
137. LA. CONST. art. VIII, preamble.
138. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1).
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2. Adequacy Language in Education Clauses

A second line of state education clauses focuses on standards rather
than equality, which formed the basis for “adequacy” claims during
education finance reform.139 A number of states that use equity language
fall into this category as well—Colorado, for example, requires its
education system to be both “thorough and uniform.”140 Florida, Idaho,
Minnesota, New Mexico, and Wyoming all also contain both equity and
adequacy language in their education clauses.
Few states explicitly call for adequacy—in fact, Georgia is the only
state that does so.141 Montana mandates only that the education be
“quality,”142 while Virginia specifies “high quality.”143 New Mexico calls
for the system to be “sufficient.”144 Wyoming states that the education shall
be “complete”145 and Louisiana simply mandates a “minimum foundation
of education.”146 The majority of “adequacy” language constitutions,
however, use the terms “thorough,” “efficient,” or both. Colorado and
Idaho specify “thorough” but have no efficiency language, Arkansas,
Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, and Texas call for an “efficient” system with
139. See generally McUsic, supra note 86 (“Under a standards theory, a plaintiff argues
that the education article of the state constitution mandates some absolute minimum level of
education that certain districts are failing to meet.”).
140. See COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable,
provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free
public schools throughout the state, wherein all residents of the state, between the ages of six
and twenty-one years, may be educated gratuitously.”).
141. See GA. CONST. art. 8 (stating that “an adequate public education for the citizens
shall be a primary obligation of the State of Georgia.”).
142. See MONT. CONST., art. X § 1. (“The legislature shall provide a basic system of
free quality public elementary and secondary schools.”).
143. See VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. (“The General Assembly shall provide for a system
of free public elementary and secondary schools for all children of school age throughout the
Commonwealth, and shall seek to ensure that an educational program of high quality is
established and continually maintained.”).
144. See N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (“A uniform system of free public schools sufficient
for the education of, and open to, all the children of school age in the state shall be
established and maintained.”).
145. See Wyo. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (“The legislature shall provide for the establishment
and maintenance of a complete and uniform system of public instruction, embracing free
elementary schools of every needed kind and grade, a university with such technical and
professional departments as the public good may require and the means of the state allow,
and such other institutions as may be necessary.”).
146. See LA. CONST. part. VIII §13 (stating that schools shall be funded “in order to
insure a minimum foundation of education in all public elementary and secondary
schools.”).
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no “thorough” language. Six states—Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia—all require the education system to
be both “thorough and efficient.” The most prevalent illustration of the
“thorough and efficient” challenge occurred in New Jersey in Abbott v.
Burk,147 which is the New Jersey Supreme Court’s twentieth opinion
dealing with education finance.148 The series of opinions in the Abbot
litigation has focused on one issue: whether the plaintiffs have been
deprived of the right to a thorough and efficient education.149
Other states, however, contain no qualifying language at all. Nineteen
states have education clauses phrased in very general terms. Alaska, for
example, states only that “the legislature shall by general law establish and
maintain a system of public schools open to all children of the State.”150
The other eighteen states without qualifying language contain similar
clauses—mandating a system of public schools without providing any
guidance as to the quality of those schools. This lack of qualifying
language, however, has not precluded courts from finding funding schemes
unconstitutional.151 As discussed in the next section, courts have varied
wildly from state to state on their interpretations of these qualifying
phrases, or lack thereof.
D. Outcomes in Education Finance Reform
1. Education as a Fundamental Right
Since 1971—the year of the first major school-funding suit—all but
five states have addressed the constitutionality of their education financing
systems.152 Often, the state courts’ decisions turned upon whether they
147. See Abbott v. Burke (Abbot XX), 971 A.2d 989 (N.J. 2009) (holding that the
School Funding Reform Act was constitutional because it satisfied the requirements of the
through and efficient education clause).
148. See McUsic, supra note 86, at 334 (summarizing the holding of major cases in
education finance reform).
149. See Abbott, 971 A.2d at 991 (“Finding that more severely disadvantaged pupils
require more resources for their education, the Court held that the State must develop a
funding formula that would provide all children, including disadvantaged children in poorer
urban districts, which an equal educational opportunity as measured by the Constitution’s
thorough and efficient clause.”).
150. AK. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
151. See discussion infra Part III.D.
152. See Gormley, supra note 78, at 213–14 (“Since 1971, the year of the first major
school-funding suit in California, litigants in forty-five states have challenged the
constitutionality of their states’ educational funding schemes using the federal and state
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found education to be a fundamental right; however, such a requirement
was only dispositive when plaintiffs used an equity argument.153 Currently,
twenty states have found that education is a fundamental right.154 Of those
twenty states, courts of sixteen states invalidated their education finance
systems as unconstitutional: Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut,
Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming.155 Four states, however, upheld education finance systems
despite finding a fundamental right to an education: Minnesota, Oklahoma,
Virginia, and Wisconsin.156 The court in Minnesota, for example, found
that education was a fundamental right, but that this right does not extend to
the funding of the education system.157 The court in Virginia reached a
similar conclusion.158 The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that education
was a fundamental right, but that the legislature had sole discretion to
decide how to distribute state funds.159 The court in Wisconsin found
education to be a fundamental right, yet still used a rational basis standard,
reasoning that plaintiffs had not been denied an equal opportunity for a
sound basic education and thus no fundamental right was violated in the
funding disparity.160

constitutions.”).
153. See McUsic, supra note 86, at 313 (noting that invalidating an education finance
system on the basis of an equity argument “virtually requires” that education be a
fundamental right).
154. See
EDUCATION
JUSTICE,
THE
EDUCATION
LAW
CENTER,
http://www.educationjustice.org/ (providing an overview of the education finance litigation
in every state) (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993) (finding that students have a
fundamental right to a “general and uniform” education, but that such a right does require
full equalization of funding).
158. See Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 141–42 (Va. 1994) (holding that
“education is a fundamental right under the Constitution,” but that “nowhere does the
Constitution require equal, or substantially equal, funding or programs among and within the
Commonwealth’s school divisions”).
159. See Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1149 (Ok.
1987) (stating that children had a fundamental right to an adequate education according to
standards set forth by the State Board of Education).
160. See Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (1989) (finding that education was a
fundamental right but that funding disparities did not implicate the right).
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2. The Rejection of Education as a Fundamental Right

Coincidentally, just as many states as have found education to be a
fundamental right have rejected the claim that education is a fundamental
right—twenty states currently hold that education is not a fundamental right
under state educational clauses.161 Of those twenty, fourteen states have
upheld their financing systems as constitutional: Alaska, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Nebraska, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.162 Six of the twenty
have determined that education is not a fundamental right but have
nonetheless overturned their state financing systems: Arkansas, Kansas,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee.163 An additional three
states have not addressed the fundamental right issue but have still
overturned their financing systems (Maine, New Mexico, and Vermont),
while two states have pending legislation.164
No patterns emerge, however, between a state’s constitutional
provision and that state’s success in overturning its education financing
system. States overturning their finance systems have equity language
(Arizona, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington, and
Wyoming), adequacy language (Kentucky, Montana, Texas, and West
Virginia), both equity and adequacy language (Wyoming and New
Mexico), and some have no qualifying language at all (Alabama,
California, Connecticut, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Maine, and
Vermont).165
This lack of a clear pattern, while certainly suggesting that there is no
specific formula that courts use in overturning education systems, illustrates
that reform is possible even when states do not consider education a
fundamental right, nor does reform require specific language in the state’s
education provision. The diversity of the education finance outcomes
suggests that both equity and adequacy arguments could be used to overturn
“last hired, first fired” mandates. The two cases examined below illustrate
the emerging jurisprudence in this area: the first is an adequacy claim,
which recent scholarship has hailed as the education reform argument du
jour. The second is the only case to have addressed the constitutionality of
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See EDUCATION JUSTICE, supra note 154.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Section III.C.
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“last hired, first fired” systems specifically and which, despite the current
success of adequacy claims, uses an equity argument to overturn “last hired,
first fired” systems in the Los Angeles Unified School District.
E. The Emerging Jurisprudence
1. Campaign for Fiscal Equality v. New York
The first case study provides an illustration of how courts have
successfully overturned education systems based on an adequacy argument.
While no court has yet overturned “last hired, first fired” policies based on
an adequacy argument, the use of adequacy in finance reform could easily
be shifted to “last hired, first fired” reform, as illustrated by the case
below.166 The shift to adequacy broadened the scope of interpretation
because, though the issue was still finance reform, the focus was no longer
a comparison of monetary distributions, and instead shifted to whether the
state had fulfilled its constitutional obligation to provide a certain quality of
educational opportunity.167
A leading New York case in adequacy litigation, Campaign for Fiscal
Equity, Inc. v. State168 illustrates how the evolution from adequacy to equity
claims opens the door for “last hired, first fired” reform. Though the case
addressed finance problems, the trial court’s (CFE II) definition of
adequacy moved beyond monetary challenges, defining an adequate
education in terms of basic skills necessary for civic participation. 169 In
2003, the Court of Appeals—the highest court in New York—affirmed the
lower courts and emphasized educational “inputs” as the primary measure
of adequacy.170 As one scholar notes, “[t]he New York Court of Appeals
made three crucial interpretive choices: to entertain an adequacy case, to
define adequacy in terms of schools’ role in preparing children for their role
as citizens, and to measure adequacy using education inputs identified by

166. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995),
discussed infra.
167. See Hubsch, supra note 95, at 1325 (describing the evolution of education finance
reform challenges from equity to adequacy).
168. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 655 N.E.2d at 661 (holding that underfunded schools
denied children of their right to an adequate educational opportunity).
169. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 2001)
[hereinafter CFE II Trial].
170. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893 (N.Y. 2003)
[hereinafter CFE II].
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the court itself, mixed with education outputs.”171 The court determined
that an adequacy argument was not too vague to entertain, defining
adequacy as “the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to
enable children to eventually function productively as civic participants
capable of voting a serving on a jury.”172
Notably, the court focused on educational “inputs” rather than
educational “outputs.”173 The court based adequacy on curriculum
implementation, school buildings, class size, and—most importantly to this
discussion—the quality of teachers, stating that “minimally adequate
teaching” was a constitutional requirement.174 Though the court in CFE II
measured teacher quality by the number of certified teachers, certification
exam results, and undergraduate education,175 it is not a far leap from
inadequacy based on these measurements to inadequacy based on “last
hired, first fired” policies. The CFE case therefore marks an important shift
toward education inputs as the primary measure of adequacy, rather than
outputs or some measure designed by the legislature.176 The CFE decision
consequently illustrates a trend toward education inputs—and specifically
teacher quality—as a measure of adequacy, creating viable groundwork for
input-based reform focusing on “last hired, first fired” policies.
2. Reed v. California
Despite the current trend of adequacy claims in education reform, the
first and only court to specifically address “last hired, first fired” reform
reverted back to an equity rather than an adequacy argument.177 As the
decision notes, the equity claim succeeds because California considers
education a fundamental right.178
In January 2011, the California Superior Court approved a class action
settlement halting “last hired, first fired” layoffs in Los Angeles public
171. See Kagan, supra note 81, at 2245.
172. See id.
173. See CFE II at 919 (stating that improved inputs yield better student performance).
174. See id. at 492–500.
175. See id.
176. See Kagan, supra note 81, at 2241 (“Thus, the judiciary’s consideration of inputs
would form the primary measure of adequacy, rather than pure reliance on outputs or some
other legislatively crafted measure.”).
177. See Reed v. State, No. BC432420 1, 1 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2011)
178. See id. at 12 (describing the impact on students’ fundamental right to an
education).
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schools.179 The settlement resulted from a claim brought by parents of
children in three inner-city schools, arguing that state-mandated seniority
based layoff policies violated their children’s state constitutional right to an
equal and adequate educational opportunity.180 Pursuant to Education Code
section 44955 and its collective bargaining agreement, the Los Angeles
Unified School District (LAUSD) had administered teacher layoffs in
reverse-seniority order.181 In May 2010, before the settlement, the court
issued a preliminary injunction to prevent layoffs, finding that “Plaintiffs
had shown a really and appreciable impact on their constitutional right to an
equal educational opportunity and that there was no compelling interest
justifying the seniority-based layoffs at Plaintiffs’ schools.”182
While the equal educational opportunity has traditionally been used in
support of finance reform, the California Superior Court interpreted the
term to include “the failure to deliver in the classroom.”183 In approving the
settlement, the court relied on evidence that high teacher turnover “destroys
the teacher support infrastructure necessary for the quality delivery of
educational content . . . destroys the student-teacher relationship necessary
to deliver quality education . . . [and] is associated with low standardized
scores.”184 The court found that because of these problems, students’
educational opportunities were compromised.185 According to the court, the
fact that the seniority layoff system was the result of a union bargaining
agreement made no difference: “Under no circumstance can LAUSD
bargain away students’ constitutional rights.”186
In setting forth the unconstitutionality of “last hired, first fired”
reform, the court first looked to the state constitution’s education clause.
Though California is one of the nineteen states with no qualifying language
in its constitution, California nonetheless considers education to be a
fundamental right.187 As such, the court stated that “[t]he California
179. See id. at 1.
180. See Osmond, supra note 64 (summarizing the settlement approval in Reed).
181. See Reed, No. BC432420 at 1 (giving the background on the settlement decision).
182. Id. at 1.
183. See Reed v. State, No. BC432420 1, 1 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2011) (“In its
reductions in force (RIFs) in 2009 and again in 2010, LAUSD administered teacher layoffs
in reverse-seniority order pursuant to Education Code section 44955 and its collective
bargaining agreement.”).
184. See id. at 25–27.
185. See id. at 29 (“The evidence clearly demonstrates the impact of layoffs at
struggling LAUSD schools.”).
186. See id. at 4.
187. See id. at 3 (stating that education is a fundamental right in California) (citing Butt
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Constitution guarantees to all California public school students a
fundamental right to basic equality of educational opportunity.”188 After
finding that the high teacher turnover was detrimental to the quality of
educational opportunities afforded, the court then used an equity argument
to illustrate why the school district’s seniority-based layoff system was
unconstitutional.189 Because California considers education a fundamental
right, the court applied strict scrutiny.190 The court found that purely
seniority-based layoffs fell disproportionately on schools that were already
struggling academically, and found no compelling interest justifying the
policies191 As such, the court found that the district’s seniority-based RIFs
violated the plaintiffs’ “fundamental constitutional right to a basic
education (a right cognizable as a subset of constitutional equal protection
rights).”192
IV. Proposal: Applying Finance Reform Strategies to Effect “Last Hired,
First Fired” Reform
The evolution of education finance reform, states’ abilities to broadly
construe their education clauses, and the emerging jurisprudence set forth
above all illustrate that both the equity and adequacy strategies utilized in
education finance reform can be used by state courts to effect “last hired,
first fired” reform.
A. Applying Finance Reform Strategies: Equity v. Adequacy
The analysis of the CFE and Reed decisions illustrates that courts have
two viable options in effecting last hired reform—both an equity argument
and an adequacy argument.193 The move from equity to adequacy in
v. State, 4 Cal. 4th 668 (1992).
188. See id. at 2 (internal quotations omitted).
189. See Reed v. State, No. BC432420 1, 27–28 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2011)
(noting the devastating effects of teacher turnover, which result in children being denied an
equal educational opportunity).
190. See id. at 3 (finding that “strict scrutiny is triggered under equal protection because
of the fundamental right of education”).
191. See id. at 32 (“LAUSD’s data show that LAUSD’s academically struggling
schools receive a disproportionate share of layoffs.”).
192. See id. at 6.
193. See discussion supra Part III.E.1–2 (comparing the adequacy approach in CFE to
the equity approach in Reed).

RIF’D OFF

499

education reform was not a clear shift, but instead resulted in cases in which
the courts addressed both claims.194 As Koski notes: “[t]hat courts often
intertwined the language of equity and adequacy demonstrates both their
inability to articulate a clear standard for constitutional compliance and
their desire to maintain flexibility in school finance jurisprudence.”195 This
flexibility allows for two possible solutions: an equity claim for states that
consider education a fundamental right and an adequacy claim for those
that do not.
1. The Equity Argument
With regard to states the consider education to be a fundamental right,
the analysis of Reed suggests that an equity argument would prove to be the
most viable option.196 As previously noted, equity arguments in finance
reform sought equality of funding for all school districts.197 The decision in
Reed, however, illustrates that such a claim works for education “inputs”
such as teacher quality as well.198 As such, equity claims lend themselves
well to “last hired, first fired reform.” As discussed supra Part III.D.1,
equity arguments are virtually limited to those states that consider education
a fundamental right.199 Thus for the twenty states recognizing education as
a fundamental right, the equity claim provides the strongest argument for
“last hired, first fired” reform.200 The twenty states rejecting education as a
fundamental right—as well as the eight states that have not addressed the
issue—nevertheless have the ability to effect reform through an adequacy
claim.
2. The Adequacy Argument
States rejecting education as a fundamental right still have an
alternative remedy for reform. As illustrated by the fact that more than a
quarter of the states rejecting education as a fundamental right nonetheless
194. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text (discussing the murky line
between equity and adequacy claims).
195. Koski, supra note 98, at 1187–88.
196. See discussion supra Part III.E.2 (analyzing the equity claim in Reed).
197. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 184–188 and accompanying text (noting that in Reed the court
determined that teacher quality affected a student’s fundamental right to an education).
199. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
200. See discussion supra Part III.D.1 (providing an overview of the states that
recognize education as a fundamental right).
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overturned their financing systems as unconstitutional illustrates the fact
that “last hired, first fired” reform is not limited to states that consider
education a fundamental right.201 As illustrated by the New York court’s
opinion in CFE, adequacy claims, like equity claims, can move beyond
monetary challenges to focus on more qualitative inputs, such as adequate
curriculum, class size, and teacher quality202—all factors that are adversely
affected by seniority-based layoff policies.203 The court’s focus on “inputs”
as the primary measure of adequacy provides solid groundwork for
adequacy based “last hired, first fired” reform.204
Equity and adequacy claims thus prove to be equally viable—and very
similar—options for “last hired, first fired” reform. As Koski notes,
however, “[t]hat courts have fused their equity and adequacy analyses
suggests not only that the supposed demarcation between ‘second wave’
equity cases and ‘third wave’ adequacy cases is not so distinct, but also that
courts instrumentally adopt either equity or adequacy analyses to meet their
own policy objectives and maintain their institutional legitimacy and role in
state governance.” Such a comment highlights the main critique and
biggest hurdle for “last hired, first fired” reform—the claim that such
reform is akin to judicial activism.205
B. Overcoming Challenges to Reform
1. The Least Dangerous Branch?
As previously noted, “last hired, first fired” advocates will face the
challenge of judicial deference to state legislature.206 In light of the Reed
decision, some legal academics have predicted that this judicial intervention
in education reform could “inspire a new wave of litigation to improve this
201. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (noting that of the twenty states
rejecting education as a fundamental right, six still overturned their education financing
systems as unconstitutional).
202. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
203. See discussion supra Part II.C. (illustrating the negative effects of seniority-based
layoff policies).
204. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (noting the shift toward input-based
standards of adequacy).
205. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting that advocates of “last hired,
first fired” reform will have to overcome the argument that education adequacy is largely a
legislative issue).
206. See discussion supra Part III.B. (analyzing the role of state legislatures in
education reform).
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country’s troubled schools.”207 David Gregory, a law professor at St.
John’s College called the decision “a shifting of the tectonic plates . . . [i]f
this were to move forward, every major district in the country is going to
look to this as the model . . . It would be the most innovative system in the
country. . . .”208 This case, some say, could provide the transition from
education finance reform to a new wave of quality reform.209
An obvious critique of this predicted solution is the threat of judicial
activism.210 The critique is one of checks and balances: “[I]f the court
abuses its power and intrudes in areas reserved to the other branches, there
is no ‘check’ within the constitution itself to bring the courts back into the
fold . . . Therefore, the potential for judicial ‘tyranny’ from adequacy suits
is very real. . . .”211
In The Least Dangerous Branch? Consequences of Judicial Activism,
Stephen Powers and Stanley Rothman present a critique of judicial activism
in general, but address education specifically in the context of Brown v.
Board of Ed.212 Though the critique focuses on federal courts, the general
contentions are easily applied to the state courts at issue in education
reform.213 Powers and Rothman look specifically at Brown and the widespread use of busing as a means of desegregating schools, calling it “[o]ne
of the more protracted, complex, and controversial court-initiated
policies.”214 They contend that evidence illustrates how busing was a
narrow and simplistic response to a large social problem.215 Linking the
example to a broader critique of judicial activism, they state that “the
principles advanced by the courts were less problematic than the remedies
that they often imposed in their wake, [leading to] unintended consequences
that did not necessarily serve even the interests of the intended beneficiaries
207. Osmond, supra note 64.
208. Simone Wilson, L.A. Teachers Union Loses Historic Lawsuit to ACLU: No More
‘Last Hired, First Fired,’ L.A. Weekly (Jan. 21, 2011), http://blogs.laweekly.com
/informer/2011/01/aclu_wins_lawsuit_utla_seniori.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
209. See Osmond, supra note 64 (detailing the potential impacts of the Reed decision).
210. See Koski, supra note 98, at 789 (stating that “some have labeled the recent trend
toward judicial intervention in education governance unwelcome ‘activism’”).
211. Id. at 99.
212. STEPHEN P. POWERS & STANLEY ROTHMAN, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH?
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 1 (2002) (stating that the evaluation will include an
examination of how the judiciary has intervened to alter the operation of public schools).
213. See id. (noting that in the past fifty years the federal judiciary has been engaged in
judicial activism).
214. See id. at 37.
215. See id. at 57–58 (criticizing busing as a solution to school desegregation).
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of these changes in law and policy.”216 This critique, however, focuses
primarily on the judiciary’s intervention into the means of reform. As such,
it can be distinguished from the judicial intervention in later education
reform in which the courts limited their decisions to findings of
constitutional inadequacy but left the means for reform to the legislature.217
If courts, in reforming “last hired, first fired” policies, limit their decisions
to constitutional findings, they avoid the risk of judicial activism and
therefore remain an appropriate vehicle for reform. Examining whether
“last hired, first fired” policies are inadequate remains strictly a question of
constitutional interpretation, in which the courts clearly have authority. In
limiting decisions to this question, then, the courts would not overstep into
determining what policies the legislature must use to provide an adequate
education.
Koski contends that the judiciary, rather than being an inappropriate
vehicle for reform, is uniquely suited to do just that: “Because courts do
not need to be responsive to majoritarian politics and because their
decision-making is based on constitutional text and values . . . court
participation in social policy-making through judicial review is not only
legitimate, it is necessary to ensure the just treatment of all individuals and
groups in a democracy.”218 Koski argues that even judges who are not
elected are checked by more than the vague notion of “separation of
powers.”219 Instead, even electorally unaccountable judges are checked by
the notion that if their decisions are not viewed by the public as legitimate,
they run the risk of being ignored and consequently ineffective.220 As such,
courts have inevitably become part of the educational policy-making
landscape in spite of the fact that this role of the judiciary places the power
in the hands of a select few, possibly unelected, officials.221 In spite of
criticism, the recent trend has been an increasing level of judicial

216. Id. at 58.
217. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (1989) (holding
that Kentucky’s entire education system was unconstitutional in that inequitable financing
had adversely affected students in the state, but leaving the means of reform to the state
legislature).
218. Koski, supra note 98, at 798.
219. See id. (noting that even with regard to judges who are not held electorally
accountable to the public, judges do not wield unchecked power).
220. See id. (explaining why judicial intervention is necessary and does not pose a
threat to judicial legitimacy).
221. See id. (arguing that the question should not be whether judicial intervention is
appropriate but rather under what conditions it is necessary and effective).
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involvement; as the modern state becomes more administrative and
managerial, judicial policy making becomes more and more necessary.222
2. Taking Reed Beyond California
The second major challenge to “last hired, first fired” reform involves
taking the court’s landmark reform in Reed beyond the California borders.
As previously discussed, many state courts have been successful in
overturning unconstitutional education finance decisions, but California is
the only state to specifically address “last hired, first fired” reform.223 Legal
scholarship on education reform, however, suggests that state courts when
interpreting state constitutional provisions, states often look beyond their
own jurisdictions to those with similar clauses.224 As one scholar notes,
“[w]hile one state’s interpretation may legitimately vary from another’s
based on a different history, state courts would lose valuable resources if
they did not look beyond their borders to the history and interpretation of
other states’ similar clauses.225 As previously discussed, many states share
similar qualifying language in their education provisions, focusing on terms
such as “general,” “uniform,” and “efficient.”226 Because “the discursive
context of state education clauses lies in other states’ clauses, the shared
history that led states to adopt such clauses, and subsequent development of
those clauses,” it follows that state constitutional interpretation considers
other relevant state clauses.227 As such, “last hired, first fired” reform is not
destined to remain inside California’s borders.
V. Conclusion
Since the rejection of education as a federal constitutional right in
Rodriguez, states have taken it upon themselves to provide students with an
educational opportunity. “Last hired, first fired” policies interfere with a
222. See id.
223. See discussion supra Part III.D. (providing an overview of education finance
challenge outcomes).
224. See Kagan, supra note 81, at 2260 (stating that Justice Robert R. Utter of the
Washington Supreme Court suggested that “an innovative state court can create a laboratory
for constitutional interpretation applicable to other states.”).
225. See id.
226. See discussion supra Part III.C. (analyzing the language of state education
clauses).
227. See Kagan, supra note 81, at 2260.
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student’s education opportunity, regardless of whether a state regards the
right as fundamental. From an adequacy standpoint, these policies result in
inadequate teacher quality and curriculum through high turnover rates, as
well as an increased classroom size. From an equity standpoint, these
policies adversely affect the low-income, inner-city schools that already lag
behind in educational performance.
Through their education clauses, states have a viable tool with which
to reform these policies. The flexibility of the language itself, coupled with
courts’ ability to broadly interpret these clauses in education finance
reform, suggest that courts may use these clauses to effect “last hired, first
fired” reform. The emerging jurisprudence sets forth a solid ground upon
which state courts can bring both equity and adequacy claims to enjoin this
harmful policy.

